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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, one of the principal applications of
customary international law in U.S. courts has been in human rights
litigation brought under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). In its current

form, the statute provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' The
ATS is no modem innovation. It was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789
that first established the federal courts and was a response to experience
under the Articles of Confederation that showed the danger of leaving
redress for violations of the law of nations-the eighteenth-century name
for customary international law-to the courts of the several states. 2
*
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the American Enterprise Institute's 2006 conference on
Outsourcing American Law. Thanks to John Yoo for comments on an earlier draft.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
2.
The origins of the ATS have been the subject of exhaustive historical research. See

William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation ofthe Law ofNations, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989);
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).

21
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In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court of the United
States at last addressed the scope of the ATS. It held that the ATS
authorizes the federal courts to apply customary international law
without any further action by Congress because the provision was
"enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations
with a potential for personal liability at the time." After acknowledging
that the First Congress was thinking of violations of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy, the Court
nevertheless concluded that federal courts may recognize claims "based
on the present-day law of nations [that] . . . rest on a norm of

international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized." 4 In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
centuries-old principle "that the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations." 5
Yet the decision in Sosa raises as many questions as it answers.
Specifically, Sosa says nothing directly about the role of customary
international law in the constitutional plan of the United States. Is
customary international law, for example, among "the Laws" that Article
II of the Constitution requires the President to "take Care . . . be
faithfully executed"? Is customary international law included in the
"Laws of the United States" for the purposes of federal court jurisdiction
under Article III? And does customary international law bind the states
under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI in the same way as federal
statutes and treaties? It is to these unresolved questions, that this article is
mainly addressed.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ALIEN TORT LITIGATION

Professor Curtis Bradley has noted that alien tort litigation has come
in waves.6 The first wave began in 1980 with the Second Circuit's
decision in Filartigav. Pena-Irala, which held that the ATS gave the
federal courts jurisdiction over a suit between two aliens for torture that
occurred in Paraguay.7 As Professor Harold Koh has written, Filartiga

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).

3.
4.
5.

Id. at 725.

6.

Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights ofAction, I CHI.

Id. at 729.

J. INT'L L. 421, 421 (2000).
7.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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was the Brown v. Board ofEducation of international human rights, 8 and
a series of similar suits soon followed. These first-wave suits share
certain characteristics: they are disputes between two aliens; they allege
grave violations of human rights such as torture, extrajudicial killing,
genocide, and war crimes; and they involve violations that occurred
abroad.
A second wave of alien tort suits began in the 1990s. In these
suits, the defendants are corporations-usually U.S. corporations.
Although these suits sometimes allege violations of human rights by the
defendants themselves, they often proceed on a theory of vicarious
liability, seeking to hold corporations liable for "aiding and abetting" the
acts of foreign governments. A famous example is Doe v. Unocal, in
which a class of Burmese villagers brought suit alleging that Unocal had
aided and abetted the Burmese military's program of forced labor for the
construction of a pipeline. 9
The third wave of alien tort suits involves claims against U.S.
government officials and others working on behalf of the U.S.
government. Although some such suits were filed as early as the 1980s,
this wave has swelled with cases arising from the war in Iraq and U.S.
anti-terrorism policies. 10
A. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was one of these third-wave cases. It
began in 1990 when Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was indicted in the
United States for his alleged participation in the torture and murder of a
DEA agent in Mexico. When Mexico refused to extradite Alvarez, the
DEA came up with a plan to abduct him and bring him to the United
States for trial, which was accomplished with the help of a group of
Mexicans including Jose Sosa. Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment
because of the DEA's conduct, but the Supreme Court held that his
abduction did not affect the jurisdiction of the district court." At trial,
the district court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal at
the close of the government's case. Alvarez then sued the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and his Mexican abductors under the

8.
Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 403 F.3d 708
9.
(9th Cir. 2005).
10. See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism,
19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105 (2005).
11.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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ATS. The district court awarded $25,000 in damages against Sosa, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.12
Although the case arose long before September 11, 2001, it was
fraught with implications for the "war on terror," for it raised the
possibility that U.S. officials or others who might aid them in capturing
and detaining foreign suspects could be subject to civil liability for
violating customary international law. It was this aspect of the case that
made Sosa an attractive one for the Bush Administration to take to the
Supreme Court, and a frightening one for supporters of the first-wave
suits like Filartiga. But considerations from the second wave of
corporate cases critically affected decisions by Sosa's counsel and the
Bush Administration about which arguments to press before the Court.
Sosa's principal argument to the Supreme Court was that no suit
could be brought under the Alien Tort Statute unless Congress had
granted an express cause of action. This "cause of action" argument
came from Judge Bork's concurring opinion in a 1984 case called TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic.13 Judge Bork had written that the ATS
was purely jurisdictional and that further action by Congress was
necessary to create a right to sue for violations of customary international
law. In 1992, Congress passed such statute-the Torture Victim
Protection Act14 -but it provided an express cause of action only for
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing against individuals. Since
corporations are probably not "individuals" within the meaning of the
TVPA, success on the "cause of action" argument would have eliminated
at one stroke the second-wave cases, as well as any first- or third-wave
cases founded on claims other than torture or extrajudicial killing.
Neither Sosa's counsel nor the Bush Administration chose to
make the alternative argument that alien tort suits between aliens were
unconstitutional because they exceeded the limits of Article III's grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal courts, an argument ably
sketched in a 2002 article by Professor Bradley. '5 If successful, this
argument would have barred the suit in Sosa and other third-wave cases
involving foreign defendants. It would also have barred first-wave cases
12. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13. 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
14. Pub. L.No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note).
15. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587
(2002). It is possible that the district court might have had supplemental jurisdiction over
Alvarez's claim against Sosa under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because of Alvarez's federal claim
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but supplemental jurisdiction
does not seem to have been argued. See William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in
American Courts, 93 VA. L. REv. 653, 665 n.61 (2007).
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between aliens like Filartiga.But it would not have stopped the secondwave cases against American corporations because Article III of the
Constitution expressly provides for jurisdiction over "Controversies ...
between . . . the Citizens [of a State], and foreign

.

. .

Citizens or

Subjects."
Sosa thus became a stalking horse for the corporate cases. The
$25,000 in damages awarded against Sosa hardly justified taking the case
to the Supreme Court, but Sosa's counsel was also counsel to Unocal.
The Bush Administration had supported the "cause of action" argument
with an amicus brief in Unocal and saw Sosa as a good vehicle to present
that argument to the Supreme Court.
This strategic choice proved a poor one for opponents of the ATS,
because in choosing the argument with the broadest impact they also
chose the one with the weakest historical basis. It is clear beyond doubt
that in 1789, when the ATS was passed as part of the First Judiciary Act,
the law of nations was considered part of the general common law.16 No
express cause of action was needed because the common law provided a
right of action for "torts in violation of the law of nations" just as it
provided a right of action for other torts. The Supreme Court thus
rejected the "cause of action" argument in Sosa, and in a part of the
opinion joined by all nine justices held that the ATS "is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time."' 7
Justice Souter's opinion went on to hold that suits could be
brought under the act not just for violations of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy, but also for
violations of "the present-day law of nations" that "rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized."' 8 At this point, Souter lost three votes. Justice Scalia's

16. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 824 (1997); Koh,
supra note 8, at 2354; Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law,
42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1989); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and
Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1513, 1517 (1984); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1557 (1984).
17. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 1 disclose that I wrote the amicus
brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History urging the position the Supreme
Court adopted. See id. at 714.
18. Id. at 725.
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concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, argued that the Court's rejection of a "general federal common
law" in the 1938 case Erie Railroad v. Tompkins had closed the door to
ATS suits based on modem international law.' 9 Scalia's opinion drew
heavily on a 1997 Harvard Law Review article by Professors Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith arguing that after Erie federal courts should
treat customary international law as state, rather than federal, common
law. 2 0 The majority, however, rejected the Bradley-Goldsmith position,
expressly characterizing modem customary international law as "federal
common law," 21 at least for purposes of the ATS.
B. The Future ofAlien Tort Litigation
The effect of Sosa was to endorse the status quo in alien tort
litigation. Although the Court reversed the award of damages, holding
that Alvarez-Machain's brief detention violated no well-established norm
of customary international law, 2 2 the standard it adopted for general
acceptance and specificity was in substance the same one that lower
courts had been applying in the first-wave cases. Indeed, the Court stated
that its standard was "generally consistent" with lower-court decisions,
citing several with approval including Filartiga.23 It seems clear, then,
that the first-wave of alien torts suits between aliens for grave violations
of human rights abroad will continue in U.S. courts.
The prognosis for the second-wave suits against corporations is
still uncertain. The Second Circuit has gone furthest in attempting to rein
in such suits after Sosa.24 In PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., the Second Circuit held that a defendant could not be held
liable for aiding and abetting unless it acted with the purpose of
facilitating violations of international law. 25 Then, in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit held that corporations
could not be held liable under the ATS at all. 26 The Eleventh Circuit has
19. Id. at 746 (Scalia, J. concurring).
20. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 870.
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
22. Id. at 738.
23. Id. at 732.
24. Sosa did not address the corporate cases directly. In one footnote, the Court noted that
if the defendant were a private actor like a corporation, the question would arise whether
international law applied. 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. In another footnote, the Court referred to cases
filed against corporations that did business in South Africa under apartheid, suggesting that the
federal courts might properly defer to the political branches if the executive filed a casespecific objection based on foreign policy. Id. at 733 n.21.
25. See 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2010 WL 1607314 (Oct. 4, 2010).
26. See 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).
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disagreed on both points, holding that "corporate defendants are subject
to liability under the ATS"17 and that knowledge is enough for aiding
and abetting liability. 28 At the moment, the Supreme Court is not
disposed to intervene. It denied petitions for certiorari in Talisman
raising both issues.29
As a historical matter it is clear that the ATS was meant to apply to
violations of the law of nations by private parties even if they were not
acting under color of state law. Each of the three eighteenth-century
paradigms the First Congress had in mind-violations of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy-involved
precisely that kind of situation. It is also clear that in the eighteenth
century those who aided and abetted violations of the law of nations
could be held liable. In his discussion of offenses against the law of
nations, William Blackstone noted that, both at common law and by
statute, accessories to piracy were subject to punishment by death like
principals. 30 President Washington's 1793 Neutrality Proclamation
threatened punishment under the law of nations not just for those who
committed hostilities against other nations but also for those "aiding and
abetting hostilities against any of the said powers." 3 Finally, liability for
violations of the law of nations was not limited to natural persons during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,32 and the text of the
ATS imposes no such limitation.33
At first, Sosa appeared to give a boost to the third-wave suits.
Although the Court held that "a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment" was not actionable, 3 4 the Bush Administration's antiterrorism policies hardly fit that description. Many of the third-wave
cases involved allege violations like torture that clearly meet the Sosa

27. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (1Ith Cir. 2009).
28. See Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1159 (11 th Cir. 2005).
29. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2010 WL 1607314 (Oct.
4, 2010); Talisman Energy, Inc. v. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 2010 WL 2033143 (Oct. 4,
2010).
30. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66, *72.
31. GEORGE WASHINGTON, PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted
in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES,
1745-1799, at 430-31 (J.C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).

32. See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (1l Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1825) ("a piratical aggression
by an armed vessel sailing under the regular flag of any nation, may be justly subjected to the
penalty of confiscation for such a gross breach of the law of nations").
33. The ATS requires that the plaintiff be an alien but imposes no limitations on who may
be a proper defendant. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
34. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
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standard. And the day before Sosa came down, the Court made a point of
noting in Rasul v. Bush that prisoners in detention could still bring alien
tort claims.35 But these suits met with little success after Sosa. In 2006
Congress prohibited all suits by aliens detained as enemy combatants, 36
and other claims have been barred under the Westfall Act.37
But beyond its direct impact on alien tort litigation, the Sosa
decision speaks more generally to the place of customary international
law in the U.S. legal system. It holds that customary international law
may be applied as federal common law even if not expressly
incorporated by Congress. Moreover, Sosa's approach allows us to
address other questions that the decision itself left open-questions
concerning the place of customary international law in our constitutional
scheme.
1II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW

Sosa directly answers one question that has caused a good deal of
academic controversy-whether customary international law is federal
common law or state common law. While this controversy might seem
like a technical one of interest only to law professors, it has important
implications. If customary international law were state common law,
then federal courts would not be able to apply it in ATS cases or others
unless it had been adopted by the courts of the state whose law applied.
Each state would also be free to interpret customary international law in
its own way, and federal courts would be bound to follow those
interpretations. If, on the other hand, customary international law were
federal common law, then all courts-federal and state-would be bound
by uniform rules. Federal courts would be free to apply those rules
irrespective of what the states had done and indeed irrespective of
whether Congress had incorporated customary international law by
statute, so long as they had jurisdiction over the particular case.
The question is a modern one. At the time of the Framing, the law
of nations was neither federal nor state common law. Those categories
did not exist. Rather, the law of nations was understood to be part of the

35. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
36. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2635-36 (2006), (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2)). The Supreme Court's
decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), held this unconstitutional only with
respect to petitions for habeas corpus.
37. See Karen Lin, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the
Westfall Acton the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718 (2008).
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general common law, which was binding on both federal and state courts
alike without any need for legislative incorporation. As Attorney General
Edmund Randolph noted in an early legal opinion for Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, "[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted
by the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of
the land."0 8
In 1938 the Supreme Court put an end to the regime of general
common law in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins 3 9 and substituted a system in
which the common law was generally state law, with small pockets of
federal common law. Erie raised the question of where customary
international law fit into the new system.
Not long after Erie, Professor Philip Jessup argued that customary
international law should be treated as federal common law. "Any
question of applying international law in our courts," he wrote, "involves
the foreign relations of the United States and can thus be brought within
a federal power.

. .

. It would be as unsound as it would be unwise to

make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of
international law." 40 Twenty-five years later, in Banco Nacionalde Cuba
v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court seemed to endorse Jessup's argument
"that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and
perhaps parochial state interpretations," reasoning further that "[h]is
basic rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine."41 Thus,
the orthodox view, as summarized in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, has been that "[c]ustomary international law is
considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal

law." 42
This view was not without its critics, however, and prominent
among them were Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, whose 1997 article
in the HarvardLaw Review argued that federal courts could not apply
customary international law after Erie without some domestic
authorization to do so. Early decisions applying the law of nations as
general common law provided no authority to apply customary
international law as federal common law. Since there was also no
authorization in the U.S. Constitution or in federal statutes, they argued,
federal courts could apply customary international law only if it had been

38.
39.

1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

40. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroadv. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939).

41.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).

42.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§

Ill cmt. d (1987).
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incorporated into state law. 4 3 Although Bradley and Goldsmith refer to
the view that customary international law is federal common law as the
"modem position,"44 it is worth noting that their own view that
customary international law should be considered state common law is
equally modem. Both views try to fit customary international law into a
post-Erie framework that is far removed from the original understanding.
The Sosa decision speaks directly to this controversy. Sosa's
lawyers and the Bush Administration argued that federal courts could not
apply customary international law in alien tort cases without further
authorization from Congress in the form of an express cause of action. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed. With respect to the federal
courts' power to apply customary international law as federal common
law, he followed the basic outlines that Bradley and Goldsmith set down.
"Because post-Erie federal common law is made, not discovered," Scalia
wrote, "federal courts must possess some federal-common-law-making
authority before undertaking to craft it." 4 5 Neither pre-Erie decisions
applying the law of nations nor the ATS provided such authority. "PostErie federal common lawmaking ... is so far removed from that generalcommon-law adjudication which applied the 'law of nations' that it
would be anachronistic to find authorization to do the former in a
statutory grant of jurisdiction that was thought to enable the latter." 4 6
The Sosa majority, however, rejected the argument that Erie had
"close[d] the door" 47 on the federal courts' ability to apply customary
international law as common law. "Erie did not in terms bar any judicial
recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances,"
the Court wrote, "and post-Erie understanding has identified limited
enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a
common law way. For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic
law of the United States recognizes the law of nations." 48 The majority
stressed continuity and its desire to do justice to the original
understanding of the ATS, noting that "it would be unreasonable to
assume that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to
lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply
because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the

43.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 870.

44.

Id at 816.

45.
46.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring).

47.

Id. at 729.

48.

Id
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road to modem realism." 4 9 And lest there be any doubt about how claims
under customary international law fit into the post-Erie world, the Court
expressly characterized such claims as "claims under federal common
law." 50
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION

While settling some questions about the place of customary
international law in the U.S. legal system, the Sosa decision left open a
number of others. To illustrate, it is useful to look at an exchange of
footnotes between Justice Scalia and the majority. In a footnote to his
concurring opinion, Scalia argued that if customary international law
were federal common law for ATS purposes it would be federal common
law for all purposes. Thus, it would bind the states under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI and would serve as the basis for "arising under"
jurisdiction both for the purposes of Article III and for the purposes of
the general federal question statute. If the general federal question
statute reached violations of customary international law, then any such
violation could be brought in federal court without regard to the
limitations imposed by the ATS that the plaintiff be an alien and that the
suit sound in tort.
The majority responded with a footnote of its own. It denied that
cases involving customary international law would fall within the general
federal question statute. The ATS, it noted, "was enacted on the
congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by
entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations;
and we know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was
extended subject to any comparable congressional assumption."52 But

49. Id. at 730.
50. Id. at 732. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have tried to salvage what they can of
their position, claiming that Sosa actually supports their argument that "courts can domesticate
CIL [customary international law] only in accordance with the requirements and limitations of
post-Erie federal common law." Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore,
Sosa, Customary InternationalLaw, and the ContinuingRelevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV.

869, 874 (2007). The latest version of the Bradley-Goldsmith thesis misreads Sosa, is contrary
to the original understanding, and fails Erie's own test of legitimacy. See William S. Dodge,
Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19

(2007).
51. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id at 731 n.19. For an argument that the Court was wrong and that Congress did
expect at least some cases arising under the law of nations to fall within the general federal
question statute, see Gwynne Skinner, FederalJurisdiction over U.S. Citizens' Claims for
Violations of the Law ofNations in Light ofSosa, 37 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 53 (2008).
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the majority refused to be drawn on the constitutional questions, leaving
those issues for another day.
So how does customary international law fit into the Constitution
of the United States? Is it binding on the states under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI? Is it part of the "Laws of the United States" over
which Article III gives the federal courts jurisdiction? Or for that matter,
is it part of "the Laws" that Article II requires the President to "take Care
... be faithfully executed"? 53 Sosa does not answer these questions, but
it does provide a method that may be used to analyze them.
Sosa's method is both particularized and evolutionary. 54 It is
particularized in that it rejects the all-or-nothing approach of Justice
Scalia and many legal scholars that treats customary international law as
federal common law either for all purposes or for none. Instead, as
illustrated in its different treatment of the ATS and the general federal
question statute, Sosa's method proceeds statute by statute and
constitutional provision by constitutional provision. This makes good
sense because, as we shall see, the text and history of each provision are
different. To illustrate briefly, Article II of the Constitution refers
broadly to "the Laws" that the President shall take care be faithfully
executed. Article III uses a narrower phrase "the Laws of the United
States" in describing the jurisdiction of the federal courts, while the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI refers even more narrowly to "the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of this
Constitution]." As a simple matter of interpretation, different phrases in
the same document should generally be interpreted to mean different
things. To conflate them, as Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Sosa
does, is to violate the most basic rules of constitutional interpretation.
Sosa's method is evolutionary in that it begins with text and
history but does not end there. The Sosa Court devoted a good deal of
attention to the original understanding of the ATS, but it went on to
consider modem developments that "argue for judicial caution when
considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement the
jurisdiction conferred by the early statute."5 5 In the context of the ATS,
the Court noted five reasons for caution. First, the prevailing conception
of the common law had changed, so that today "there is a general
understanding that the law is not so much found or discovered as it is
53.

See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007)

for an excellent discussion of these questions and others from a textualist viewpoint.
54. See William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the US. Legal
System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 96-100 (2004).
55. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
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either made or created." 5 6 Second, the role of the federal courts in
making common law changed with Erie, which prohibited them from
making common law generally and confined them "to havens of
specialty."s? Third, the modem view is that "the decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the
great majority of cases."5 Fourth were the potential implications for the
foreign relations of the United States:
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on
our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another to
consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on
the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold
that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits...
.Yet modern international law is very much concerned with just such
questions .... .

Fifth, and finally, Congress had given the federal courts no "mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of
nations."6 o
The Sosa Court's evolutionary approach of considering not just
the original understanding but also modem developments makes good
sense. There have been enormous changes in both international law and
in the domestic legal system over the past two hundred and twenty
years.61 To list just the three most significant, the understanding of
customary international law changed dramatically during the nineteenth
century from a foundation of natural law to positivism based on state
practice and consent; 62 the place of customary international law in the
U.S. legal order changed in the early twentieth century when Erie
abolished the general common law and replaced it with the categories of
state and federal common law; 6 3 and the roles of our branches of
government in making and interpreting customary international shifted
with the rise of positivism during the nineteenth century and with the
Id.
Id. at 726.
58. Id. at 727.
59. Id
60. Id at 728.
61. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., forthcoming 2011).
62. See William S. Dodge, The Paquete Habana: Customary InternationalLaw as Partof
56.
57.

Our Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES

175, at 187-89 (John E. Noyes, Laura A.

Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 222-25 (1947); Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine
of Incorporation,26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 252-60 (1932).
63. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ascendancy of the President in foreign affairs during the twentieth.64 In
short, in the area of international law it is not possible to be a strict
originalist because the Framers' world no longer exists. One must
necessarily translate the original understandings into modern terms.
Let us turn then to apply Sosa's particularized, evolutionary
method to three constitutional questions: whether customary
international law binds the President under Article II; whether Article III
gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising under it; and
whether it binds the states under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.
A. CustomaryInternationalLaw and the President
Article II of the Constitution requires that the President "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." If the law of nations is among "the
Laws" referenced in Article II, then the text of the "Take Care" Clause
would seem to impose upon the President a constitutional duty to obey
customary international law.
Certainly that was the original understanding. The issue arose
shortly after ratification in the context of the neutrality debate. The
United States had entered a Treaty of Alliance with France in 1788.
Following the French Revolution of 1789, France became embroiled in
wars with a number of European powers, finally declaring war on
England early in 1793. Although popular feelings favored France, the
Washington Administration judged it in America's interests to remain
neutral in these conflicts, and on April 22 President Washington issued a
Proclamation of Neutrality. The Proclamation promised "a conduct
friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers." U.S. citizens
were warned that if they violated "the law of nations, by committing,
aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers" they would
not receive the protection of the United States and would be prosecuted
for their violations.65
To counter objections to the Proclamation, Alexander Hamilton,
wrote a series of essays under the name "Pacificus." Hamilton argued for
complete presidential control over foreign affairs as an incident of
executive power, save only in those instances, such as making treaties
and declaring war, where the Constitution expressly gave authority to
one or both houses of Congress. (And even these exceptions, he argued,
"are to be construed strictly." 66 ) As a constitutional source of authority,
64.

See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign

Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. I (1999).
65.
66.

PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY, supra note 31.
Pacificus No. / (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
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Hamilton relied in part on the "Take Care" Clause. "The Executive is
charged with the execution of all laws, the laws of Nations as well as the
Municipal law, which recognizes and adopts those laws," Hamilton
wrote. "It is consequently bound, by faithfully executing the laws of
neutrality, when that is the state of the Nation, to avoid giving a cause of
war to foreign Powers."67 In Hamilton's view, the law of nations was
part of "the Laws" under the "Take Care" Clause, and the President was
"consequently bound" to observe it.
Under pressure from Thomas Jefferson, James Madison took up
his pen to respond. Writing under the name "Helvidius," Madison argued
that the nature of the executive power was to execute existing laws, and
that the powers over war and treaties were properly legislative.68 In his
second essay, Madison dissected Hamilton's paragraph, quoted above,
relying on the "Take Care" Clause. That the executive was charged with
the execution of all laws including the law of nations, Madison declared
to be "a truth." Madison then misread Hamilton (perhaps deliberately) as
suggesting that the executive was bound to execute the law of nations
only to avoid giving cause of war to foreign powers. In response to this
straw man, Madison emphasized that the executive was bound by the law
of nations, irrespective of whether other nations would take offense,
simply because it was part of the laws: "It is bound to the faithful
execution of these [laws of neutrality] as of all other laws internal and
external, by the nature of its trust and the sanction of its oath." 69
Hamilton's and Madison's agreement about the "Take Care"
Clause in the neutrality debate is striking for it was virtually the only
thing about which they agreed. By 1793, these former allies and coauthors (with John Jay) of The Federalist had come to disagree about
almost everything. Hamilton took a broad view of executive power;
Madison a narrow one. Yet "Pacificus" and "Helvidius" did agree on
this: the law of nations was part of "the Laws" under Article II and the
President was "bound" by it.
For the courts, a key question was whether the President has
authority to supersede customary international law as a rule of decision.
HAMILTON 33, 42 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
67. Id. at 40; see also id. at 43 ("The President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the
laws. Our Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land.")
"Helvidius " Number 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
68.
MADISON 66, 67-72 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].

Helvidius Priscus was a first-century Roman opponent of imperial rule, who was executed by
the Emperor Vespasian.
69.

"Helvidius" Number 2 (Aug. 31, 1793), reprinted in 15 MADISON PAPERS, supra note

68, at 86.

HeinOnline -- 17 Willamette J. Int'l L. & Dis. Res. 35 2009

36

WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 17:21

The Marshall Court repeatedly acknowledged that Congress possesses
such authority. The Court did so implicitly in cases like Talbot v. Seeman
and The CharmingBetsy, 70 and explicitly in The Nereide where Marshall
wrote that "[t]ill such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of
nations which is a part of the law of the land."7 1 This line from The
Nereide at least suggested that the President lacks a similar power, for
the President cannot pass an act by himself.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. United States is
sometimes cited as authority for the President to disregard customary
international law. 73 Referring to the law of nations in general and to the
law of war specifically, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will. The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even
of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and
although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may
be disregarded.74
The words "his" and "him" seem to refer to a single person, and out of
context the passage appears to support a presidential power to violate
customary international law. In context, however, it is clear that Marshall
was speaking of sovereigns in general, most of whom happened to be
kings and therefore "hims." It is equally clear that with respect to the
United States, Marshall viewed "the sovereign" not as the President
alone, but as Congress and the President acting together through the
legislative process. The whole question in Brown was whether the
executive branch could exercise the right of the United States under the
law of nations to condemn enemy property during the War of 1812
without express authorization from Congress. Writing for the Court,
Marshall held that it could not. "That war gives to the sovereign full
right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy
wherever found, is conceded." 7 5 Yet even a declaration of war did
not vest that sovereign right in the executive. "[T]he power of

70. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) ("the laws of the United States
ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages
of nations"); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains").
71. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
72. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
73. See generally Michelle Akerman, Brown v. United States. The Paquete Habana, and
the Executive, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 149 (2008).

74.
75.

Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128.
Id. at 122.
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confiscating enemy property is in the legislature," Marshall
concluded, and "the legislature has not yet declared its will to
confiscate property which was within our territory at the
declaration of war."76 If the executive lacked even the power to
exercise the United States' rights under the law of nations, it
certainly lacked the power to violate that law.
The point becomes clear beyond dispute when one reads the
dissenting opinion of Justice Story. Story thought that the
declaration of war in 1812 was enough to enable the executive to
seize British property. But even he-the strongest advocate of
executive power in this case-was absolutely certain that the
President could not violate the law of nations. The President, Story
wrote, "cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among
civilized nations[.] He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize
proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims." 77
The view that the President could not violate customary
international law persisted throughout the nineteenth century, even with
the rise of positivism. Advocates of presidential power sometimes cite
the Supreme Court's statement in the 1900 case The Paquete Habana
that "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations." 78 They argue that the reference to a "controlling
executive

.

.

.

act" recognizes a presidential authority to supersede

customary international law. This passage is at best ambiguous, however,
since executive acts are placed on a par both with legislative acts, which
clearly could violate customary international law, and with judicial
decisions, which clearly could not. It is also dictum, unnecessary to the
Court's decision. Indeed the Court went to great lengths to note that the
policy of the executive branch with respect to its blockade of Cuba
during the Spanish-American War was to observe and respect customary
international law. More probative are the legal briefs that the Department
of Justice submitted to the Supreme Court, in which the Department
argued at great length about the content of the international law rules
governing the capture of enemy ships as prizes of war but never once
asserted that the President or his subordinates had authority to violate
those rules. 79 And most conclusively, of course, the Supreme Court ruled
76.

Id. at 129.

77. Id. at 153 (Story, J., dissenting).
78. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For discussion of this case, see
Dodge, supra note 62.
79.

See Jordan J. Paust, Paqueteand the President: Rediscovering the Brieffor the United
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against the executive branch in The Paquete Habana, holding it liable
under customary international law for capturing a coastal fishing vessel
in violation of that law.
The proposition that the executive acting by itself might have
authority to violate customary international law only became tenable in
the twentieth century as the Supreme Court began to view the President
as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.'
Today, such authority is sometimes claimed to be a
functional necessity. The example frequently given is President
Truman's 1945 proclamation asserting a new right over the resources of
the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United States. This
proclamation arguably violated existing customary international law, but
was soon followed by other coastal states, and a new rule of customary
international law emerged. If states cannot violate customary
international law, state practice cannot change and the rules of customary
international law cannot develop. And if the United States cannot violate
customary international law, it cannot participate in the development of
these new rules. 8 '
One may concede the necessity for the United States to be able,
on occasion, to violate customary international law without taking the
extreme position that the President acting alone has the authority to place
the United States in violation of those rules. As we have seen, the
original understanding was that the President was bound by customary
international law. It may be that the modern world requires a departure
from the original understanding, but the burden should be on those
arguing for the departure to prove its necessity.
B. Customary InternationalLaw and the Courts
While state courts may hear any case in which they have
jurisdiction over the parties, federal courts are limited by Article III of
the Constitution to hearing only certain categories of cases. Congress can
choose to withhold some of this jurisdiction from the federal courts, but
it cannot give them a broader jurisdiction than the Constitution allows.
Article III allows federal jurisdiction over cases "arising under this

States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 981 (1994). The United States did not even argue for deference to
the executive's interpretation of customary international law. See Dodge, supra note 62, at 181
n.50.
80. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See
generally White, supra note 64.
8 1. See Jonathan I. Chamey, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
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Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority." The failure to mention cases
arising under the law of nations explicitly has led some to argue that the
federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear such cases unless jurisdiction
may be found under one of Article III's other heads of jurisdiction,
which include suits between an alien and a citizen of one of the United
States, but not suits between two aliens. 82 If this is correct, then the
Alien Tort Statute is unconstitutional as applied to suits between two
aliens-suits like Filartigaand Sosa. Although Sosa's counsel chose not
to raise this argument before the Supreme Court for reasons that have
already been mentioned, it remains a threat to future ATS plaintiffs,
particularly in first-wave suits.
Of course, it would have been unnecessary for Article III to
mention the law of nations expressly if that body of law was understood
to be part of "the Laws of the United States," and (as I have argued at
length elsewhere) that was indeed the original understanding.83 One may
begin by comparing Article III's phrase to those found in Articles II and
VI. Although "the Laws of the United States" seems narrower than
Article II's unqualified reference to "the Laws," it is also undoubtedly
broader than the corresponding phrase in Article VI-"Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of this Constitution]."
The difference with Article VI suggests that there is at least one category
of laws not made through the legislative process set out in Article I of the
Constitution that are still "Laws of the United States" for the purpose of
Article III. Historical evidence confirms that the law of nations was just
such a category.
One of the principal shortcomings of the Articles of
Confederation was that the national government lacked authority to deal
with violations of the law of nations. As James Madison wrote, "these
articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of
nations; and consequently leave it in the power of ani indiscreet member
to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations." In May 1787, just
before the start of the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason wrote that
with regard to the courts "[t]he most prevalent idea [was] . . . to establish

a judiciary system with cognizance of all such matters as depend
upon the law of nations, and such other objects as the local courts of

82.
83.

See Bradley, supra note 15.

See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 701-11 (2002).
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

HeinOnline -- 17 Willamette J. Int'l L. & Dis. Res. 39 2009

40

WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 17:21

85
justice may be inadequate to."
Even if this did not represent the thinking of the entire
Convention, it certainly reflected the views of the Virginia delegation,
whose Virginia Plan would have extended the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to "questions which may involve the national peace and
harmony."86 The alternative Pinckney Plan provided for a federal court
to hear appeals from the states "in all Causes wherein Questions shall
arise on the Construction of Treaties made by U.S.-or on the Law of
Nations."87 These plans, along with the New Jersey Plan, which made no
mention of cases involving the law of nations, were referred to the
Committee of Detail near the end of July. Although several of the
Committee's drafts provided for jurisdiction over cases involving the law
of nations, the draft reported to the Convention on August 6 limited
arising-under jurisdiction to "cases arising under laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States." Had the text remained in this form, it
would have been clear that Article III did not extend jurisdiction to cases
arising under the law of nations. On August 27, however, the Convention
voted to strike the words "passed by the Legislature." 89 This change in
the text confirms what the comparison with Article VI suggests-that the
phrase "Laws of the United States" in Article III was not limited to those
laws passed by Congress.
During the ratification debates, advocates on both sides read
Article III as allowing federal jurisdiction over cases involving the law of
nations. John Jay wrote in FederalistNo. 3:
Under the national government, treaties and the articles of treaties, as
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and
executed in the same manner-whereas adjudications on the same
points and questions in thirteen states, or in three or four

confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent. . . . The

wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the
jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only
to one national government cannot be too much commended. 90
85. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (reprinting letter from George Mason to Arthur Lee (May 21, 1787)).
86. Id at 22.
87. Id at 608.
88. Id at 186.
89. Id at 423-24, 431.
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 41, 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Alexander
Hamilton's Federalist No. 80 was more equivocal. On the one hand, he equated "the Laws of
the United States" with "laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and
constitutional powers of legislation." THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton).
On the other hand, he stated that "cases arising upon treaties and the law of nations . . . may be
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Opponents of the new Constitution read Article III the same way. At the
Virginia Convention, anti-federalist William Grayson complained:
"There is to be one Supreme Court-for chancery, admiralty, common
pleas, and exchequer, . . . to which are added, criminal jurisdiction and
all cases depending on the law of nations-a most extensive
jurisdiction!" 9 1 Significantly, none of the speakers who rose to defend the
proposed Constitution disputed Grayson's assertion that the jurisdiction
of the federal courts would extend to "all cases depending on the law of
nations."
If the original understanding of Article III was that it allowed for
federal jurisdiction over cases that involved the law of nations, do
changes in the legal order since 1787 offer any reasons to modify that
interpretation? One of the principal shifts over that period has been in the
foundations of customary international law. In the eighteenth century, the
law of nations was thought to rest primarily on principles of natural law,
which courts could discover through the application of reason alone.
Vattel wrote in his influential treatise that "the Law of Nations is in its
origin merely the Law of Nature applied to Nations,"92 and Justice Story
observed that "every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct
reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral
obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations." 9 3
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, the conception of
customary international law changed from natural law to positivism, so
that judges no longer derived its rules by reasoning from first principles
but instead looked to "the customs and usages of civilized nations,"94 or
in other words to what states actually do in practice out of a sense of
legal obligation. This shift naturally reduced the role of the judiciary in
making customary international law, as it increased the role of the
political branches.
One can see that many of the reasons for caution cited by the Sosa
Court reflect this shift. The Court repeatedly stressed the desirability of
supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction." Id. at 476.
91. The Virginia Convention (June 21, 1788) in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1445-46 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1993). Grayson referred only to the Supreme Court because Article Ill did not require
Congress to create lower federal courts.
92. E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, Intro. § 6
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758). For further discussion, see William S. Dodge,
Withdrawingfrom Customary InternationalLaw: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 169 (2010).
93. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
94. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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"legislative guidance," "legislative judgment," and a "congressional
mandate." 95 But these arguments apply with much less force to Article
III than they did to the ATS for one very simple reason: the judicial
power established by Article III is not self-vesting. Congress must pass a
statute conferring some or all of this jurisdiction on the federal courts and
Congress is under no obligation to give the federal courts all of the
jurisdiction that Article III permits. Thus, even though Article III permits
federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under customary
international law, Congress must still authorize the federal courts to hear
such cases. At the very least it must pass a statute granting jurisdiction,
like the ATS, and under modem assumptions it must create an express
cause of action as well. Thus, there is no need to fear that interpreting
Article III to embrace customary international law will lead to unbridled
involvement in foreign affairs by the federal courts.
The Sosa Court also mentioned as a reason for caution "the
potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States."96 In
the context of Article III, those implications argue in favor of the original
understanding that cases arising under customary international law are
part of "the Laws of the United States." If Congress cannot give the
federal courts jurisdiction over these cases, they will be left to the state
courts, which may interpret customary international law in divergent
ways and give offense to foreign nations. It was precisely to avoid such
possibilities, Jay noted in FederalistNo. 3, that the Constitution allowed
the federal courts to hear cases involving the law of nations. Two
centuries later, the Supreme Court still recognizes the "'uniquely federal
interests' . . . [in) international disputes implicating ... our relations with

other nations." 9 In short, the original understanding of Article III as
embracing cases arising under customary international law works as well
today as it did at the Founding.
C. Customary InternationalLaw and the States
A final issue that the Supreme Court left open in Sosa is the
relationship between customary international law and the states. If
customary international law today or at some point in the future were to
prohibit certain applications of the death penalty, for example, would the
states have to obey that law? In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of those who
95. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726-28 (2004).
96. Id. at 727.
97. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964)).
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were under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes.
Controversially, in the course of its opinion, the Court looked to foreign
practices for confirmation of its conclusion.98 Whether these foreign
practices resulted from a sense of obligation and therefore reflect
customary international law the Court did not make clear. If they did,
however, incorporating these practices through the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI offers an alternative-and perhaps a better one-to
incorporating them through the Eighth Amendment.
The Supremacy Clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The text of this clause does not mention the law of nations. Moreover, in
contrast to the unqualified phrase "Laws of the United States" in Article
III, Article VI's limiting language "which shall be made in Pursuance [of
this Constitution]" seems to exclude the law of nations. In the eighteenth
century, the law of nations was not thought of as being made through
internal processes of any nation, but primarily as an application of
natural law. Moreover, the use of the future tense in this phrase would
exclude the law of nations because that law long predated the
Constitution. As Chief Justice John Jay stated in Chisholm v. Georgia,
even before "the date of the Constitution .

.

. the United States had, by

taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the
laws of nations." 99
One might explain the omission by looking, as Sosa suggests, to
"the ambient law of the era." 100 As general common law, the law of
nations was considered binding upon the states already, and there would
therefore have been no need to list it in the Supremacy Clause. As
Professor Louis Henkin has explained, "[t]he law of nations of the time
was not seen as something imposed on the states by the new U.S.
government; it had been binding on and accepted by the states before the
U.S. government was even established."' 0'

98. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033-2034
(2010) (looking to foreign practice in holding that life without parole for juvenile offenders
who did not commit homicide violates Eighth Amendment).
99. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
100. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
101. Henkin, supra note 16, at 1566.
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Ware v. Hiltonl02 is sometimes said to reflect the understanding
that states had authority to violate the law of nations through their own
legislation. Ware involved a 1777 Virginia debt confiscation statute that
was alleged to violate both the law of nations and the 1783 Treaty of
Paris ending the Revolutionary War with Britain. With respect to the
treaty, the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause made it
superior to Virginia's statute. With respect to the law of nations,
however, those justices who addressed the question conceded that
Virginia had the authority to violate it. Justice Samuel Chase wrote:
It is admitted, that Virginia could not confiscate private debts without
a violation of the modem law of nations, yet if in fact, she has so done,
the law is obligatory on all the citizens of Virginia, and on her Courts
of Justice; and, in my opinion, on all the Courts of the United
States. 103

Justice Iredell agreed: "admitting that the Legislature had not strictly a
right, agreeably to the law of nations, to confiscate the debt in question;
yet if they in fact did so, it would . . . have been valid and obligatory
within the limits of the States." 1 0 4

In fact, Ware does not support the proposition that states may
violate the law of nations under the Constitution for the simple reason
that the confiscation statute at issue was passed before the Constitution,
or even the Articles of Confederation, came into effect. Virginia's
position under the law of nations in 1777 was that of an independent
nation, a point emphasized both by Chase and by Iredell.
More
reflective of the original understanding is Rutgers v. Waddington, a case
argued by Alexander Hamilton and decided by the Mayor's Court of
New York.106 In the spring of 1783, New York-then part of the United
102. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
103. Id. at 229.

104. Id. at 265.
105. See id at 224 (Chase); id at 266 (Iredell). Both Chase and Iredell also found it
significant that the rule against confiscating debts was only a rule of "customary" law and not
of "voluntary" law. See id at 227 (Chase); id. at 263 (Iredell). International law at the time
distinguished between "customary" rules based on state practice that nations could opt out of
(at least with proper notice), see VATTEL, supra note 92, Intro. §§ 25-26, and "voluntary" rules
based on natural law to which nations were bound irrespective of their actual consent. See id.,
Intro. § 21, Bk. III § 192. Indeed Chancellor George Wythe found the same Virginia statute
invalid under the law of nations because he took the rule against confiscating debts to be based
on natural law and not just custom. See Page v. Pendleton, Wythe's Rep. 211, 212 & n.(b) (Va.
Ch. 1793). For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Customary International Law,
Congress, and the Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL
LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531 (Pieter
Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds., 2010)
106. Both Hamilton's papers and the court's opinion are reprinted in I JULIUS GOEBEL,
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States under the Articles of Confederation-passed a Trespass Act to
allow those whose property had been occupied by the British to sue for
damages. Hamilton argued that the act was contrary to the law of nations,
which no individual state had the authority to violate. The court avoided
this question by construing the statute not to conflict with the law of
nations, but it acknowledged that there was "vey great force in the
The court reasoned
observation arising from the foederal compact."
that "to abrogate or alter any one of the known laws or usages of nations,
a single state, must be contrary to the very nature of
by the authority of
10 8
confederacy.",
the
Even if the original understanding had been that the states were
not bound by the law of nations, there are good reasons today to depart
from that understanding. First, the Supreme Court has held that other
sources of law not mentioned in Article VI are nevertheless supreme
over state law. In United States v. Belmont,109 the Court held that
executive agreements override inconsistent state law. After noting that
the supremacy of treaties was established by the express language of
Article VI, the Court reasoned that "the same rule would result in the
case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the national government
and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the
part of the several states." 10 The same reasoning applies equally to
customary international law. Although its supremacy is not established
by the express language of Article VI, it follows "from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the national government."
Second, "the potential implications for the foreign relations of the
United States""' argue in favor of supremacy for customary
international law. The Sosa Court observed that "[i]t is one thing for
American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State and
Federal Governments' power, but quite another to consider suits under
rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens."l12 Nevertheless, the Court
interpreted the ATS to allow suits against foreign officials for violations
of customary international law. The quotation suggests that holding
JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 282-

419 (1964).
107. Id. at 405.
108. Id. at 406.
109. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
110. Id. at 331.
111. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
112. Id.
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states to obey the obligations of customary international law would not
raise similar foreign relations concerns. In fact, recent experience shows
it is the failure of states to follow international law that may cause
difficulties with other nations. State violations of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations with respect to foreign nationals arrested for
capital crimes have led other nations to sue the United States in the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). '13 One may expect a similarly
hostile reaction from other nations if a state tried to execute a foreign
national in violation of customary international law-the prohibition
against executing pregnant women, for example.
Finally, binding the states to obey customary international law
under the Supremacy Clause would be less invasive of state sovereignty
than what the Supreme Court is currently doing-using foreign practices
to interpret the Eighth Amendment. Congress has no power to overturn
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. But it does
have the power to violate customary international law and so could
authorize states to engage in practices like the executing of pregnant
women that would violate that law, even if customary international law
were held to be binding under the Supremacy Clause.
Holding the states to the rules of customary international law
under Article VI would thus fit with the proper allocation of authority
over international affairs in the modern U.S. legal system. On the one
hand, it would help ensure that states could not embroil the United States
in disputes with other nations by violating customary international law.
On the other hand, it would recognize that the final word on whether the
United States will follow those rules properly rests with Congress rather
than with the courts.

113. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31);
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27). In Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346
(2008), the Supreme Court held that the I.C.J.'s judgment in Avena was not directly
enforceable in American courts. Mexico filed a request for interpretation, and on July 16, 2008
the I.C.J. ordered the United States take all measures necessary to ensure that Medellin and
four other Mexican nationals were not executed until they received the reconsideration
required by the Avena. After Texas executed Medellin without providing such reconsideration,
the I.C.J. found unanimously that the United States had breached its order of July 16. Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/139/14939.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain stands both for continuity and for change.
On the one hand, it strives hard to understand and to give effect to the
views of the founding generation. It rejects the "avulsive" break with the
past urged (ironically) by Justice Scalia, who would have read Erie to
abolish by judicial fiat the notion that international law is part of the law
of the land. 114 As the Court put it in response to Scalia, "it would be
unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected
federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international
norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical
cachet on the road to modern realism." 115 On the other hand, Sosa also
tries to appreciate and to accommodate the enormous changes in
international and domestic law that have occurred over the course of
more than two centuries. It rejects blind originalism in favor of a more
balanced and nuanced approach.
In my view, the Court got the balance right in Sosa. It held that
federal courts may continue to hear claims under modem customary
international law without expanding those claims beyond what the First
Congress might reasonably have expected or beyond what the current
division of responsibility for foreign affairs will reasonably allow. It held
that customary international law constitutes federal common law in the
post-Erie world without opening the floodgates to claims under the
general federal question statute unless Congress passes express causes of
action.
Of course, Sosa also leaves a host of questions unaddressed, and I
have tried to suggest what some of the answers might be using Sosa's
own approach. The original understanding was that the President was
bound by customary international law under Article II of the
Constitution, that the federal courts could be given jurisdiction over
cases arising under customary international law under Article 1II, and
that customary international law bound the states under Article VI.
In my view, the original understandings of Articles III and VI
remain as persuasive today as they were in 1787. Congress should have
the option of letting the federal courts hear cases arising under customary

114. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring).

115. Id. at 730.
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international law so that such cases will not have to be left to the courts
of several states. Nor should the states be free to violate customary
international law, at least without the express authorization of Congress.
Article II presents a closer question. While I accept the argument that the
United States must be free to violate customary international law if it is
to participate in the development of that law, I am not convinced that the
President must have the authority to do this without congressional
authorization.
In sum, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain is a landmark decision charting
the relationship between international and domestic law, a decision as
significant as the Supreme Court's Sabbatinoll6 opinion forty years
earlier. Like Sabbatino, Sosa is likely to be the subject of endless
arguments about what it says and what it means. This is not because the
opinion is unclear, but rather because it implicates a host of issues that
stretch far beyond the specific question that the Court decided.

116. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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